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A NEW ERA IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 
Samantha Buckingham* 
In the last decade, the Supreme Court has decided four juvenile 
cases—Roper v. Simmons,1 Graham v. Florida,2 J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina,3 and Miller v. Alabama.4 These four cases have changed 
the landscape of juvenile justice in the United States. In October 
2012, the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review convened a symposium 
on Juveniles and the Supreme Court to explore what the future 
extensions and limitations of these landmark cases may be. The 
following issue of the Law Review continues this exploration. 
This Introduction provides a description of the overall trends in 
juvenile justice in Part I in order to situate the recent cases in a 
historical context. Part II then briefly describes what happened in 
each of the four cases. 
 I.  SITUATING ROPER, GRAHAM, J.D.B., AND MILLER IN A HISTORICAL 
CONTEXT 
A retrospective look at some of the recent trends in juvenile 
justice demonstrates that the Court’s recent decisions in Roper, 
Graham, J.D.B., and Miller, have ushered in a new era in juvenile 
justice in America. Most notably, science has played a pivotal role to 
inform the Court’s decisions and change the way the law interacts 
with children in the juvenile justice system. 
 
 * Samantha Buckingham is a Clinical Professor and a Co-Director of the Juvenile Justice 
Clinic at the Center for Juvenile Law and Policy (CJLP) at Loyola Law School Los Angeles. She 
supervises students who represent juvenile clients in delinquency courts in Los Angeles, and she 
teaches courses in the areas of Criminal Law, Trial Advocacy, and Juvenile Law. Prior to joining 
the faculty at Loyola Law School in 2008, Ms. Buckingham advocated on behalf of indigent 
clients for five years as a trial attorney at the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia 
(PDS). Prior to that, she taught high school at the Maya Angelou School, a Washington, D.C., 
charter high school for adjudicated and at-risk youth. 
1.  543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
2.  130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
3.  131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
 4. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
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Historically, courts have struggled with reconciling a juvenile’s 
age and status as a child with the treatment of juvenile offenders who 
commit crimes. There is tension between two competing notions: (1) 
how much should juveniles be afforded the same rights as and 
treated equally to adults, and (2) how much should juveniles receive 
different—better or worse, more lenient or harsh—treatment than 
adults?5 
Scholar Martin Guggenheim has written about three different 
eras of juvenile justice in America, during which the justice system’s 
treatment of juveniles changed along the lines of the tension between 
the similarities and differences between children and adults.6 The 
first era, roughly from 1900 to 1967, was characterized by the 
influence of Progressive advocates who strove to create a separate 
court for juveniles.7 Those separate courts treated juveniles less 
formally and focused not on whether a child was culpable, so much 
as what society could do to intervene and help the child.8 These 
separate juvenile courts had the child’s “best interests” as their goal.9 
The second era, from 1967 to 2009, was characterized by an 
attitude viewing children as the same as adults.10 This era began in 
1967 with the Court’s landmark decision In Re Gault.11 In response 
to the informal courts created by the Progressives, the Gault Court 
 
 5. Juvenile courts throughout the country have been created with a special rehabilitative 
purpose. Yet not all children have the opportunity to have their cases heard in juvenile court. 
Some are transferred to adult court and subjected to the same criminal punishments as adults. 
Most recently, the Supreme Court has recognized differences between children and adults in 
Roper, Graham, J.D.B., and Miller, as discussed infra Part II. 
 6. See Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age Appropriate 
Sentencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 457, 464–74, 487 (2012) (summarizing two distinct 
eras in juvenile justice while arguing that Graham ushers in a third). 
 7. Id. at 464–66. For a more complete discussion of the Progressive movement and the 
drawbacks of the children-are-different approach, see Robin Walker Sterling, “Children Are 
Different”: Implicit Bias, Rehabilitation, and the “New” Juvenile Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1017 (2013). 
 8. See Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 465 (“[Progressives] believed that society’s role was 
not to ascertain whether the child was ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent,’ but ‘What is he, how has he become 
what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him 
from a downward career.’” (quoting Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 
119–20 (1909))). 
 9. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967); see also Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 464–66 
(discussing Progressive views of the juvenile justice system). 
 10. Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 466–74. 
 11. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1. 
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recognized a child’s rights to procedural fairness.12 Justice Fortas 
penned these now-famous words in Gault in 1967: “Under our 
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo 
court.”13 Gault held that juveniles in juvenile courts are entitled to 
the same due process rights as adults, including the rights to notice of 
charges, to counsel, to confront witnesses, and to be free from self-
incrimination.14 Gault triggered a due process rights revolution, 
creating a line of cases where children were afforded most of the 
same rights as adults who are prosecuted in criminal court.15 
During this era where children were viewed as the same as 
adults, there were also a number of popular trends which functioned 
not to protect children but rather to subject them to treatment and 
punishment that was equivalent to those meted out to adults. In the 
1980s and 1990s, the image of the juvenile “superpredator” fueled a 
popular conception that juvenile crime had become a crisis in 
America.16 In the decades that followed, legislative change enabled 
children to be prosecuted as adults in adult criminal courts more 
easily, often empowering prosecutors to directly file charges in adult 
courts without judicial oversight.17 Children convicted in adult 
courts, like the child defendants in the cases of Roper, Graham, 
Jackson v. Hobbs,18 and Miller, were subjected to adult-style 
punishments—mandatory minimums, the death penalty, and life 
without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Although Roper laid the 
groundwork for the present-day developments in juvenile justice, 
 
 12. Id. at 61 (Black, J., concurring). 
 13. Id. at 28 (majority opinion). 
 14. Id. at 12–58. 
 15. Except for the right to have a jury trial, which the Court denied children in McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 528 (1971), the due process cases that followed Gault gave children 
the same rights as adults. For instance, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 360 (1970), affords children 
the right to have the charges brought against them by the State proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 16. See Samantha Buckingham, Reducing Incarceration for Youthful Offenders with a 
Developmental Approach to Sentencing, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801 (2013). 
 17. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS? 252–54 
(2005); see also Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 472–74 (“[L]egislatures in nearly every state . . . 
broaden[ed] juvenile transfer to adult court, by lowering age or offense thresholds, moving away 
from individual and toward categorical handling, and shifting authority from judges to 
prosecutors.”). 
 18. 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011). Jackson v. Hobbs is the companion case to Miller. The Supreme 
Court consolidated the two cases together when it issued its decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. 
Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). For further discussion of this case, see infra Part II. 
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because Roper was a death penalty case, the Roper Court maintained 
the mantra that “death is different.”19 
It was not until Graham was decided, and the Court announced 
that children are different outside the context of the death penalty,20 
that the third era of juvenile justice began. Informed by both science 
and common sense, the Court has repeatedly characterized children 
as different from adults throughout this third era. Beyond merely 
recognizing the differences, the Court has held that children are thus 
entitled to greater protections than adults. For example, children are 
entitled to a higher standard in assessing custody in the context of 
Miranda.21 Unlike adults, children also cannot be subjected to 
mandatory sentences of LWOP and must receive some 
individualized sentencing processes that account for the mitigating 
factor of youth.22 
Science—both developmental psychology and neuroscience—
served as the catalyst to move the Court and usher in this third and 
current era of juvenile justice.23 
 
 19. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (recognizing that the death penalty is the 
most severe punishment, only appropriate for the extremely culpable offenders who commit the 
most serious crimes). 
 20. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032–33 (2010) (reiterating the three general 
differences the Court described in Roper between juveniles and adults that make juvenile 
offenders less culpable). 
 21. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402–06 (2011). 
 22. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 at 2026, 2034. 
 23. At the symposium event at Loyola Law School Los Angeles in October, scholar, 
Professor, and Dean Randy Hertz explained that the “saga” of how the Court came to view 
children as different, and thus entitled to greater protection under the law than adults in Graham, 
J.D.B., and Miller, can be understood by the influence of science. Randy Hertz, Panel Discussion 
at Loyola Law School Los Angeles Symposium: Juveniles & the Supreme Court (Oct. 12, 2012). 
The science to which I am referring is discussed in Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65, which granted 
the petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, as well as in Graham, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2026–27; Brief for the Am. Medical Ass’n & the Am. Acad. of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (Nos. 10-9646, 
10-9647), 2012 WL 121237; Brief for the Am. Medical Ass’n & the Am. Acad. of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 
(Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 WL 2247127; Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n, Am. 
Psychiatric Ass’n, National Ass’n of Soc. Workers, and Mental Health Am. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 WL 2236778. 
For an overview of developmental psychology and neuroscience, see Buckingham, supra note 16, 
at 837–842, and for a discussion of the future implications of the science, see Francis X. Shen, 
Neurolegislation & Juvenile Justice, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 983 (2013), both in this issue. 
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 II.  OVERVIEW OF EACH 
SUPREME COURT DECISION 
In 2005, the Roper Court outlawed the death penalty for 
juveniles (offenders under the age of eighteen).24 At the time, the 
United States was one of only eight countries in the world to execute 
offenders for crimes committed when they were children.25 In 
deciding Roper, the Court looked to international norms to inform its 
decision that execution of children is cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment.26 The Court determined that “evolving 
standards of decency” required excluding children as a category of 
offenders from the death penalty.27 The Court thus announced that 
children are different from adults.28 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Kennedy based Roper’s rationale on new scientific findings in the 
area of social science and neuroscience. The Roper Court recognized 
three differences between children and adults, which necessitate a 
different punishment scheme when imposing the death penalty. First, 
children are less culpable because they do not think through their 
behavior before acting.29 Second, children are more susceptible to 
outside influence, including peer pressure.30 Third, children have 
greater potential for change and growth.31 The American Medical 
Association (AMA), American Psychological Association (APA), 
and American Bar Association (ABA) all filed briefs advancing the 
position that children are different from adults in critical ways that 
decrease their culpability and increase their potential for change. 
 
 24. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559. 
 25. The other seven countries were Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and China. Id. at 577 (citing Brief for Respondent at 49–50, 
Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1947812, at *49). 
 26. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Talking About Cruelty: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile 
Offenders After Miller v. Alabama, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 885 (2013). Pillsbury has explored the 
moral implications of cruelty in punishing juvenile offenders. In apportioning punishment for 
juvenile offenders who have committed serious violent crimes, Pillsbury asks, “How we can 
properly punish the cruelest of crimes without ourselves resorting to cruelty?” Id. at 888. 
 27. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 551. 
 28. Id. at 569. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 570. 
INTRODUCTION 9/4/2014  11:46 AM 
798 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:793 
 
Much of the science relied upon in those briefs was cited by the 
Roper Court.32 
Following Roper, the Court went on in 2010 to decide Graham, 
another Eighth Amendment case addressing the sentencing of 
juvenile offenders. In Graham, the Court outlawed the imposition of 
a sentence of LWOP for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide 
offenses.33 This landmark marked the first time the Eighth 
Amendment’s proportionality analysis was applied to limit harsh 
sentencing practices beyond the context of the death penalty. Writing 
for the Court, Justice Kennedy said that “evolving standards of 
decency” required reserving LWOP for the most culpable 
offenders.34 Again, the Court relied heavily on social science and 
neuroscience. In between its decisions in Roper in 2005 and Graham 
in 2010, the body of scientific knowledge grew, and the Graham 
Court acknowledged the additional scientific findings.35 The Court 
also recognized that penological justifications for punishment 
applied with lesser force to juveniles subjected to LWOP sentences.36 
Next, in 2011, the Court decided J.D.B. v. North Carolina.37 Of 
these four cases, J.D.B. is the only case that involved a juvenile 
charged in juvenile delinquency court.38 Thirteen-year-old J.D.B. 
was arrested and interrogated at school.39 In J.D.B., the Court held 
that age is a factor in a Fifth Amendment Miranda custody 
analysis.40 Prior to the decision in J.D.B., the last case to deal with 
the issue of age in the custody analysis was Yarborough v. 
Alvarado.41 In Yarborough, the Court said that the seventeen-year-
old, who was brought to the police station by his parents and 
 
 32. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE D. STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 
44–49 (Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 2010). Laurence Steinberg is a pre-
eminent psychologist who is often cited by the AMA, APA, ABA, and the Court. For a greater 
explanation of the science relied upon by the Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller, see 
Buckingham, supra note 16, at 837–846. For an exploration of scientific implications, see Shen, 
supra note 23, at 994–1004. 
 33. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
 34. Id. 
 35. During this time, popular articles on the teenage brain also served to inform the 
American public about the differences in the way teenagers think and behave. 
 36. See Buckingham, supra note 16, at 847–50. 
 37. See 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
 38. Id. at 2400. 
 39. Id. at 2399–400. 
 40. Id. at 2404–08. 
 41. 541 U.S. 652, 652 (2004). 
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interrogated, was not in custody for purposes of Miranda.42 The 
Court also indicated that his age was not a factor in the Court’s 
objective analysis of custody.43 In J.D.B. however, Justice 
Sotomayor relied upon common sense, rather than science, in 
explaining the Court’s rationale for determining that children are 
different and that age matters in a Miranda custody analysis.44 With 
J.D.B., the Court extended a rationale requiring different rules for 
children to an area of law beyond the sentencing context for the first 
time.45 
In 2012, the Court in Miller held that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits juvenile homicide offenders from receiving mandatory 
sentences of LWOP.46 In its Spring 2012 Term, the Supreme Court 
heard two cases challenging the imposition of mandatory LWOP 
sentences on fourteen-year-old juveniles. Those two cases involved 
Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson; the Court combined both cases in 
its Miller decision. Evan Miller was charged with murder in the 
course of arson and Kuntrell Jackson with felony-murder.47 Miller, 
along with an older teenager, set fire to a trailer and killed an older 
man.48 Jackson participated in a robbery in which his codefendant 
shot a store clerk.49 The Court’s decision in Miller again relied upon 
science in holding that juveniles could not be subject to mandatory 
terms of LWOP, even for homicide offenses.50 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Kagan said, “if . . . ‘death is different,’ children are different 
too.”51 Except to comment that a juvenile sentence of LWOP should 
 
 42. Id. at 663–66. 
 43. Id. at 666. Indeed Justice O’Connor’s opinion may have foreshadowed the result in 
J.D.B. when she said that “[t]here may be cases in which a suspect’s age will be relevant to the 
‘custody’ inquiry under Miranda v. Arizona. In this case, however, Alvarado was almost 18 years 
old at the time of his interview.” Id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 44. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403. 
 45. For a discussion of how J.D.B. applies in the school context, and more specifically, a 
discussion on whether and how the “age matters” Supreme Court cases apply to school safety and 
discipline policies and practices, see Barbara Fedders & Jason Langerg, School Discipline 
Reform: Incorporating the Supreme Court’s “Age Matters” Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
931 (2013). 
 46. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457–58 (2012). 
 47. Id. at 2457–63. 
 48. Id. at 2462–63. 
 49. Id. at 2461. 
 50. See id. at 2464–65 (noting the importance of developmental psychology and “brain 
science” in the Court’s juvenile LWOP jurisprudence). 
 51. Id. at 2470. 
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be “uncommon,” the decision was vague about the circumstances 
where a juvenile LWOP sentence would be constitutional.52 The 
Court did hold that juveniles who are entitled to LWOP are entitled 
to a “meaningful opportunity” for review of those sentences.53 The 
Court also stated that juveniles are entitled to individualized 
sentencing procedures that weigh youth as a mitigating factor.54 
Set against this backdrop, the following Law Review Issue 
launches a noteworthy exploration of the themes and the 
ramifications of the role of science in the present era of juvenile 
justice. 
 
 52. See id. at 2469. 
 53. See id. (“‘A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom,’ but must provide ‘some 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’” 
(quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010))). 
 54. Id. at 2471 (citing Roper and Graham for the proposition that youth offenders are 
entitled to a judicial process that takes their age and other attendant factors into account). 
